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Medical systemsThe DeSyRe project builds on-demand adaptive and reliable Systems-on-Chips (SoCs). As fabrication
technology scales down, chips are becoming less reliable, thereby incurring increased power and perfor-
mance costs for fault tolerance. To make matters worse, power density is becoming a signiﬁcant limiting
factor in SoC design, in general. In the face of such changes in the technological landscape, current solu-
tions for fault tolerance are expected to introduce excessive overheads in future systems. Moreover,
attempting to design and manufacture a totally defect-/fault-free system, would impact heavily, even
prohibitively, the design, manufacturing, and testing costs, as well as the system performance and power
consumption. In this context, DeSyRe delivers a new generation of systems that are reliable by design at
well-balanced power, performance, and design costs. In our attempt to reduce the overheads of fault-tol-
erance, only a small fraction of the chip is built to be fault-free. This fault-free part is then employed to
manage the remaining fault-prone resources of the SoC. The DeSyRe framework is applied to two medical
systems with high safety requirements (measured using the IEC 61508 functional safety standard) and
tight power and performance constraints.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the coming nanoscale era, chips are becoming less reliable,
while manufacturing fault-free chips is becoming increasingly
more difﬁcult and costly [1,3]. Prominent causes for this are the
shrinking device features, the sheer number of components on a
given area of silicon, as well as the increasing complexity of current
and future chips. It is expected that a signiﬁcant number of devices
will be defective already at manufacture time and many more will
degrade and fail within their expected lifetime [2]. Furthermore,
process variations as well as the increasing number of soft errors
introduce additional sources of errors for future chips.
The ITRS targets a constant defect rate (1395 defects/m2) in
order to keep the chip yield constant [6]. Such a target is expectedto substantially increase the chip manufacturing cost of future
semiconductor technologies. Alternatively, chips need to be
designed to tolerate an increasing number of defects in order to
maintain a high yield. Apart from defects at manufacture time,
aging effects are becomingmore severe leading to more permanent
and intermittent faults during the lifetime of a chip. Transistors
degrade faster; while the degradation rate is further accelerated
by the heavy testing processes (e.g. burn-in). Aging is expected
to shorten SoC lifetime and to be a signiﬁcant source of errors in
technologies beyond 16-nm [1]. Process variations cause devices
to operate differently than expected; such variations are random
dopant ﬂuctuations, heat ﬂux, as well as lithography problems
due to the shrinking geometries. Currently, on-chip clock fre-
quency and total power consumption present variations up to
30% and 50%, respectively, across different parts of a single chip;
it is projected that variations will only become more severe in
the future and worst-case, deterministic design will be insufﬁcient
and unable to deliver reliable systems. Finally, as transistor count
increases, the number of soft errors on a chip (i.e. transient faults)
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the failure rate will be almost 100-fold higher that at 180-nm
[2]; current fault-tolerance techniques such as simple check-point-
ing will, then, incur prohibitively high energy and performance
costs.
As feature size continues to shrink and chips become less reli-
able, the cost for delivering reliable chips is expected to grow for
future technology nodes. The price in system power and energy
consumption, in performance degradation, and in extra resources,
is getting higher in order to perform redundant computations in
time or in space. However, it is a well-known fact that power con-
sumption is becoming a severe problem, while performance no
longer scales very well (mostly due to power-density limitations).
To reduce some of the above costs, DeSyRe aims at reliable systems
containing and tolerating unreliable components rather than targeting
totally fault-free systems. Our goal is to describe a new, more
efﬁcient design framework for SoCs, which provides reliability at
lower power and performance cost.
Although the above technology trends make the design of
future SoCs harder, one of them can be turned to our advantage.
As shown in Fig. 1, the increasing power density limits the gate
density. In a few years, signiﬁcant parts of a chip will be forced
to remain powered-down in order to keep within the available
power budget [14]. In DeSyRe, we capitalize on this observation
and propose to exploit the aforementioned unused resources to offer
ﬂexibility and reconﬁgurability on a chip. Until now, reconﬁgurable
hardware had a signiﬁcant resource overhead; however, as ex-
plained above, this limitation no longer exists as on-chip resources
are becoming ‘‘cheaper’’. A dynamically reconﬁgurable hardware-
substrate can provide an excellent solution for defect tolerance;
it can be used to adapt to faults on demand, isolate and correct
defects, as well as to provide spare resources to substitute
defective blocks. In the DeSyRe project, we intend to use such a
reconﬁgurable substrate and combine it with system-level
techniques to provide adaptive and on-demand reliable systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Sections
2 and 3, we describe the DeSyRe design framework and system
architecture, respectively. Sections 4 and 5 summarize the DeSyRe
fault-tolerance techniques and reconﬁgurable substrate. In Sec-
tions 6 and 7, we present the medical applications and the baseline
SoCs used in DeSyRe. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 8.DeSyRe System-on-Chip
Fault Free Area2. The DeSyRe Design Framework
Systems-on-Chip comprise multiple design levels, ranging from
top-level running software to hardware components and all the
way down to the elementary technological (transistor) substrate.0
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Fig. 1. Dynamic, Static and total power consumption of a Microprocessor chip vs.
the maximum available power budget, based on the ITRS 2008 and 2009
projections.Although increasing design complexity has so far been kept in
check by partitioning the design in horizontal levels (e.g. software,
hardware, technology), this approach is rapidly becoming inefﬁ-
cient due to the increasing degree of cross-level sophistication re-
quired for modern embedded-system design. Knowledge of levels
both above and below a speciﬁc level is becoming imperative for
building functional systems. This implies a vertical, cross-cutting,
level partitioning with designers having knowledge of what tran-
spires above and below their respective levels of expertise.
To address this pragmatic need, the DeSyRe framework is parti-
tioned across two orthogonal design dimensions: a physical and a
logical abstraction. The physical partitioning is based on the differ-
ent technological substrates (with different fault densities) used in
the various parts of the framework and is mostly of interest to ex-
perts closer to the technology level. The logical partitioning consid-
ers the same framework from the viewpoint of functionality (i.e.
which part of the system does what) and should mostly interest
experts closer to the architecture and system level.
2.1. Physical Partitioning
Fig. 2 illustrates the physical partitioning of the DeSyRe SoC.
The design area is physically divided into a fault-free (FF) section
providing overall system management and a fault-prone (FP) sec-
tion providing the actual system functionality. The motivation for
this partitioning is reducing the chip cost: Designing a totally
fault-free system is expensive, thus the FF section should be small
and lightweight.
Fault-Free section: The FF section is required to provide central-
ized, system-wide control of the SoC, aiming to provide Quality of
Service (QoS) attributes such as performance, low power consump-
tion, resource utilization and fault tolerance. The various tech-
niques through which this will be achieved involve an efﬁcient
combination of:
 Online fault tolerance.
 Runtime task scheduling, while being aware of task characteris-
tics such as urgency and safety–criticality.
 Resource allocation, under varying availability of computational
resources.
 Reconﬁguration schemes to achieve ﬂexible and defect-tolerant
operation.
Fault-Prone section: The FP section is under the direct control of
the FF section. It contains various components realized in theFault Prone Area
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Fig. 2. DeSyRe SoC physical partitioning with a fault-free section for SoC manage-
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main system functionality based on the target application (do-
main). They are required to exhibit, among others, self-checking
and self-correcting properties, working in tight synergy with those
of the FF section. To this end, the various components should be
equipped with their own self-checking and -correcting mecha-
nisms, albeit under (in)direct control of the FF section.
2.2. Logical Partitioning
The logical partitioning organizes the DeSyRe SoC in three main
layers. Fig. 3 depicts the layers from bottom to top: components,
middleware and runtime system. This subdivision is based on the
abstraction level involved and the tasks handled by each layer.
Components: The bottom layer deals with fault-tolerance issues
of each component (i.e. unit which delivers a speciﬁc functionality)
in the FP section, individually. In other words, it is responsible for
providing component-level (intrinsic) fault tolerance. The system
is composed of multiple heterogeneous components located at
the fault-prone section. The design of these components takes into
account the requirements of the DeSyRe system. The components
are able to autonomously detect faults that might appear in them
and possibly correct a subset of these detected faults (in other
words, they exhibit self-checking and self-correcting properties).
To deal with the aforementioned faults, each component further
has a certain degree of ﬂexibility, by being able to support task
migration – that is, to receive a new task or transfer a running task
elsewhere. Those features, of course, require interfacing with the
above logical layers, to be able to send status information and re-
ceive commands concerning possible modiﬁcations.
For the list of faults with which a component deals intrinsically,
any detection and/or correction action from the component side
has to be transparent to the upper layers. In case there is partial
recovery – affecting functionality and QoS constraints – or no cor-
rection whatsoever, the upper layers have to be notiﬁed about the
new status of the component. Component-level fault tolerance, as
opposed to centralized techniques, provides recovery schemes
with the advantage of lower latency. On the other hand, these
schemes are, as a matter of fact, less efﬁcient than the ones sup-
ported by the upper logical layers.
Middleware: The second layer is responsible for the hardware
synthesis and reconﬁguration of the components in order to pro-
vide correctly functioning underlying hardware to the upper layer.
In this layer we develop mechanisms for the dynamic reconﬁgura-
tion of hardware resources implemented in the (ﬁne- and/or
coarse-grain) reconﬁgurable FP section. The Middleware managesL3: Runtime System:
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Fig. 3. Logical partitioning of a DeSyRe SoC: Components layer (SoC functionality),
Middleware layer and Runtime-System layer (SoC management).the components as black boxes which need to be interconnected,
isolated, (re)placed in order to deliver a functioning hardware
platform ready to be used for running the tasks that the runtime
system dictates. To one extent, the Middleware makes all its
actions transparent to the Runtime system in order to provide
well-functioning hardware; that is in order to ensure the reconﬁg-
uration process is performed correctly and installs a correct new
conﬁguration.
Runtime System: The third layer deals with run-time issues of
the system; its basic functionality is to schedule tasks to compo-
nents, to ensure the best quality of service for the soft real-time
portion of the applications, and to adapt the system in the presence
of faults. To deal with faults, the Runtime System collects system
health status information for all system components to establish
a system health map. Using the health map together with a
description of the application tasks and their requirements, the
Runtime System identiﬁes a global assignment of tasks to the var-
ious system resources that satisﬁes the application requirements
and achieves the best possible performance from the (possibly
faulty) processing cores in the fault prone area. The Runtime Sys-
tem functionality is realized in the FF section of the SoC (running
on a GPP). The main challenge for the runtime system is to be
adaptive so to conform to the underlying reconﬁgurable hardware
and to use it efﬁciently.
In addition to the above logical layers, DeSyRe is involved with
three distributed tasks that span across the three logical layers,
since all three of them need to deal with and support them:
 Online Testing: Dynamically scheduled tests for fault detection
and diagnosis, in order to constantly update the components’
status.
 Graceful Degradation: Loss of performance and/or functional-
ity is preferred to a system crash.
 Virtualization: Tasks will be able to be executed on different,
heterogeneous components as a solution to component unavail-
ability due to faults.
These distributed tasks will be further addressed in Section 4.3. DeSyRe System Architecture
The DeSyRe system architecture is designed to ﬁt the physical
partitioning and logical layers described in the previous section.
Fig. 4 illustrates the Software and Hardware modules that consti-
tute the DeSyRe SoC. The software modules are running on a
processing unit located in the fault free part, and implement the
runtime system optimizations, the middleware functionality for
reconﬁguration, as well as centralized software implemented
fault-tolerance mechanisms. At the fault-prone part, each compo-
nent has a wrapper to interface with the fault-free part of the
system and to locally support functionalities pertinent to reconﬁg-
urability and fault-tolerance.
The main hardware components of the system are instances of a
simple, MIPS-like, 5-stage RISC processor (SiMS), of a ﬁxed-point
high performance DSP processor (Xentium), and some custom
application speciﬁc components. Each of these cores is equipped
with local checkers, detecting and reporting faults, and some
degree of reconﬁgurability. The interconnection mechanism is a
Network on Chip utilizing a 32-bit bidirectional datapath and
XY-routing. Each component is provided with a wrapper, which
locally supports critical tasks by the following means: Component
reconﬁguration is controlled from the wrapper; test vector gener-
ation and response analysis for online testing can be performed lo-
cally; a watchdog is used to detect unresponsive components; the
state of components can be observed and controlled to facilitate
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the local checkers are recorded and reported to the upper system
layers.
The system hardware as it is described above, is being managed
by software running on the fault-free part of the system. A Runtime
system constantly assesses the status of the hardware components
and makes decisions on the overall system conﬁguration: The
system is dynamically optimized based on the availability of com-
ponents, the presence of defects, the workload and possibly other
constraints. Graceful degradation is employed whenever new
permanent effects are discovered to be taking place. The decisions
taken can involve remapping of the tasks to the available
components or even modiﬁcation of the set of components
through hardware reconﬁguration. In the latter case, a Middleware
module is used, that will reconﬁgure hardware as requested,
having knowledge of the reconﬁgurable resources available at
the time.
The overall system status, which is the raw input with which
the Runtime works, is monitored by the Software Fault Tolerance
layer. This part of the system employs software routines for the fol-
lowing functions: Saving check-points and using them whenever
transient faults dictate rollback of system operation; analyzing
and classifying the faults detected in hardware as transient, inter-
mittent or permanent; deciding on the need of and managing the
execution of online testing to help with the aforementioned fault
classiﬁcation; accumulating the signals from the different compo-
nents’ watchdogs and using them to keep track of (un)responsive
resources. A defect map is also kept by the Software Fault Toler-
ance layer, to record all relevant information about defect-free
and defective hardware parts.
In the remainder of this section we discuss speciﬁc system-level
parameters and consideration in DeSyRe.
3.1. Execution and programming model
The envisioned DeSyRe systems consist of multiple and poten-
tially heterogeneous Processing Elements (PEs). Mapping DeSyRe
applications to such a substrate, requires that computations arepartitioned and assigned for execution to these processing blocks.
In addition to the basic code execution, we need to address the
application and system reliability requirements. At the software le-
vel, one important functionality necessary to deal with potential
execution errors (stemming from hardware faults) is task re-exe-
cution. To be able to re-execute correctly the tasks, we need to
be able to save and restore their processing state. After investigat-
ing alternatives, we concluded that an efﬁcient way to address
these requirements is to adopt a Task-Based executionmodel, in or-
der to simplify the system design without loss of generality. This
decision affects the overall design in two ways: (a) the program-
ming model speciﬁes how the application developers should write
their code to be used in the DeSyRe platforms, and (b) it sets the
requirements for the DeSyRe Runtime System (RS).
Task-based programming models require that the programmer
deﬁnes – via explicit language constructs of code annotation – por-
tions of code that will be wrapped as a ‘‘task’’, which will be the
unit of scheduling work for execution. In addition, to allow the
exploitation of parallelism, task inputs, outputs and in-outs (vari-
ables that are read and written by the same task) are declared as
such in the source code. Doing so enables the compiler to statically
analyze dependencies and determine the possibility of parallel
execution of tasks. The same information can be also used dynam-
ically when the static analysis is insufﬁcient to determine the dy-
namic independence of tasks.
Several task-based approaches have been investigated and
shown to be efﬁcient in high-performance computing environ-
ments e.g. [16]. We use a similar approach to the OMPSs [16], but
more restricted in the sense that not all the OMPSs features are
adopted in our programming model. In DeSyRe, the programmer
will have to follow the task-based programming model, i.e. divide
the application into different tasks, and annotate them with the
task deﬁnition directives, so that the task’s inputs, outputs, and
in-outs are identiﬁed. With the code annotation of all application
tasks, the Runtime System can efﬁciently identify any data depen-
dencies, and schedule tasks in correct sequence without the need
for synchronization. In addition, the Runtime System can also take
into account other constraints i.e. energy consumption, real-time
PE 1 
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Fault-free area
Memory
Local PE 1
Memory
Local PE 2
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Local PE N
Memory
The state of a Processing Element 
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- in an other memory block of a 
remote location in the fault-prone 
part.
Fig. 5. State management in a DeSyRe system.
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be done dynamically to match the dynamic nature of the system
that changes due to faults. Thus adopting a task-based execution
model has the following consequences:
 Inter-task communication can happen only at the task
boundaries.
 Checkpoints need only be saved at the task-boundaries, and as a
consequence, domino effects during rollback are avoided.
 Architectural processor (component) state needs not to be
stored or transferred to another processor during task-migra-
tion, since migrating the task description and its inputs is sufﬁ-
cient to re-execute. In this way, task re-execution in case of
faults is simpliﬁed.
DeSyRe adopts a Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS) [27],
where the fault-free processor and all PEs can have access to any ad-
dress. Speciﬁc memory regions are (physically) local to PEs, and can
be used efﬁciently for their tasks execution. Moreover, part of the
global memory address space will be used as a global system stor-
age (GSS) region. The latter keeps common software data structures
of the Runtime System such as task dependency and application
variable tables, which are accessible by all PEs and the fault-free
processor, in order to control task scheduling and execution.
3.2. System state management
Storing reliably the system state is a major issue under the pres-
ence of hardware faults and SEUs. Migration and checkpointing of
tasks require maintaining the state reliably upon spawning tasks,
updating the state upon completion, and migrating the state to a
subsequent task. While conventional memory array error detec-
tion/correction techniques incur high latency and energy overhead
in the presence of high fault rates, there is a number of emerging
techniques that enable detection and correction at much lower
power. We are investigating the performance, energy and reliabil-
ity tradeoffs of a number of techniques to overcome memory
vulnerability for checkpointing/migrating task state at each PE of
the DeSyRe SoC. We are considering a diverse set of fabrication
technology nodes to determine the performance, energy, and area
overhead for a task with a given execution time (and rate of mem-
ory updates), while varying the fault rate. We are also studying
idempotency analysis as a way to reduce updated state during task
execution time. In particular we have considered decoupled codes
[17,18] to protect memory arrays in one node vs. parity-protected
redundant memory arrays placed on different two distinct nodes
across the NoC.
Our initial results indicate that energy-efﬁcient, decoupled
codes offer a superior performance, energy and area trade off over
maintaining duplicate copies across the NoC for near-term and
medium-term technology nodes. However, duplicate copies across
the NoC have the added beneﬁt of protecting against NoC failure
and disconnected nodes. According to these initial results, we con-
sider a fault-free substrate that can send the task state to a com-
pute node on the fault-prone substrate upon task spawn, as
shown in Fig. 5. This state is the (architecturally-visible) input
and output to the task. The state can be directly communicated
across subsequent task spawns among the compute nodes and
need not be maintained on the fault-free substrate. This practically
conﬁrms the suitability of the task-based programming model cho-
sen for the DeSyRe architecture.
(1) Task re-execution
The aforementioned task-based execution model and system
state-management and checkpointing approach, have beenimplemented in evaluated in a Microblaze-based MPSoC mapped
to a Virtex6-based ML605 development board. The MPSoC consists
of a master Microblaze (MMB) to host the runtime system, and 7
workers (WMBs) for tasks execution. We implemented a micro-
benchmark that performs a reduction tree of matrix multiplica-
tions. Starting with 24 matrices, we performed a set of 12
concurrent matrix multiplications. As soon as they are done, a
reduction phase begins with each pair being multiplied to produce
a new matrix, and after 5 such steps, a single output matrix is
calculated. The total number of multiplications is 24, requiring
in total 6 steps due to the limited number of worker cores, and
therefore the maximum theoretical speedup is 24/6 = 4.
On the left portion of Fig. 6 we plot the execution times of the
cascadedmatrix multiplications micro-benchmark execution times
on a single-processor (without runtime support) baseline system,
1-worker, and 7-worker MPSoCs. In addition, we consider three
fault error rates 4%, 20% and 41% of the tasks being faulty. Moreover,
in the second case, we assume that WMB4 becomes permanently
damaged after 5 task executions; hence the runtime detects it
and immediately migrates its remaining tasks to other active work-
ers. With a 5  5matrices size, the 7-worker MPSoC performance is
low compared to the baseline due to the tasks scheduling overhead.
However, it outperforms the baseline one when the array sizes be-
come 15  15 or larger and scales to almost 3.95 compared to the
baseline when the matrix sizes become 35  35.
We also measured the energy consumption for the same runs.
According to the Xilinx XPower utility, the baseline and 7-worker
systems require approximately 4.1 W and 4.45 W of applied
power. Fig. 6 (right part) shows the MPSoC energy consumption
for all considered cases. Compared to the baseline and for matrices
size is 5  5, the task scheduling overhead increases the overall
execution time, hence also the consumed energy, which is 16
higher. The same applies also for all fault rates considered, due
to the transient and permanent faults occurrence. However, when
the task workload increases, the overall execution time is signiﬁ-
cantly reduced compared to the baseline one, hence consumption
becomes eventually as low as 27% of the baseline energy when
there are no faults. Finally, under the largest task workload
(35  35 matrix size) energy consumption still remains less than
the baseline one for both 4% and 20% fault rates, while under a
41% error rate energy consumption is 15% higher compared to
the baseline one.3.3. Virtualization, context switching and task migration support
The selected task-based execution model and state manage-
ment functionality simpliﬁes the task of context switching, task
Fig. 6. Task-re-execution in the presense of faults: The matrix tree-multiplications micro-benchmark execution time and speedup (left), and energy consumption (right)
against the baseline system.
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system. The granularity of atomic operation in DeSyRe is estab-
lished at the task input/output boundaries and there is no need
to save the internal state of the component that runs the task. As
with the state management, DeSyRe tasks will execute until com-
pletion before the context switching, task re-execution, or task
migration will be performed. Under this scenario, only the input
(and in some cases the output) data of a task need to be saved
and when required restored. While task migration between homo-
geneous processing elements is fairly straightforward, the DeSyRe
Runtime System will also support migration to different types of
processing elements. To support task migration in heterogeneous
resources, the DeSyRe Runtime System has to be provided with
the corresponding task versions (native binaries) for multiple types
of resourses available in the system. In addition, we assume that all
heterogeneous components support all the necessary native data
types so there is no need for data conversions. Also, as the state
of tasks is saved only on task boundaries, and at the level of the
input variables, differences in the internal state of the various
components (i.e. # of registers, and architectural state in general)
do not affect task migration. The selected approach toward context
switching and virtualization will obviously increase the pressure
on the memory footprint of the application, and may be challeng-
ing in case of embedded, real-time systems. On the other hand,
removing the need of saving the heterogeneous internal states of
the components will remove completely the additional trafﬁc,
reduce the system complexity and provide a glueless support for
task migration across components with different architectures.
The advantages of the latter and the requirements of the DeSyRe
applications validated our choices.3.4. Graceful degradation
As already mentioned, the DeSyRe System on Chip is designed
to be capable of managing the accumulation of faults in the system
in a graceful manner – in other words to refrain from crashing and
instead decide to sacriﬁce part of the system functionality and/or
performance. In DeSyRe, Graceful Degradation can be achieved in
three different ways:
 Hardware Reconﬁguration: The Runtime can exploit the coarse-
and ﬁne-grain reconﬁgurability capabilities of the components,
in order to tailor the set of working components to the applica-
tion needs. Focusing on the coarse-grain, partially defective
components will be used for tasks that they are still able toperform, while the ﬁne-grain reconﬁgurable substrate will be
utilized to deal with shortages of speciﬁc functional units (see
also Section 6, Fig. 13).
 Workload Adaptation: The Runtime has the authority to adapt
the workload of the system by dropping (low-priority) tasks
or replacing tasks with other that have different processing
requirements (possibly less computationally intensive and less
efﬁcient/accurate). One approach to this is to switch between
different predeﬁned modes of the application (i.e., normal
mode, no extra features mode, emergency mode).
 Task (re-)mapping: Given the dynamic nature of both the avail-
able system resources and the software workload, the binding
of tasks to resources will also have to be modiﬁed regularly.
This can be also utilized to facilitate Graceful Degradation: If
the number of available cores is reduced, the Runtime can
either queue more tasks on the remaining cores and expect
them to be carried out slower (performance degradation) or
drop the least important tasks so that the rest are performed
without performance loss (functional degradation).
3.5. Online Testing
Permanent faults, due to design, manufacturing or aging effects,
will be detected in DeSyRe through online testing, scheduled cen-
trally by the runtime systemmanager (see Fig. 7). To facilitate such
testing, DeSyRe components will be designed with testing support
architectures suitable for that particular component. These support
architectures will include interfaces between runtime system
manager and the local online testing support alongside the actual
testing mechanism. In the following, online testing support archi-
tectures for Xentium DSP component, which is a crucial compo-
nent in DeSyRe framework, is discussed in greater detail.
To facilitate online testing, Xentium incorporates wrapper de-
sign with online testing support. The testing support architecture
contains interface with the runtime system manager via context
switching mechanism (see Fig. 4). Since online testing will require
exclusive access to Xentium’s datapath and memory, the runtime
system manager will enable context switching through local
check-pointing at the component level. Moreover, the testing
support architecture within the Xentium wrapper will contain test
vector storage or generation mechanisms for software imple-
mented built-in self test (SW BIST) and test vector analyzers
accessed through the test access mechanism (TAM) as shown in
Fig. 7. As can be seen, the online testing support architecture,
which includes the test access mechanism and test vector
Fig. 7. DeSyRe online testing support in component wrapper.
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Xentium DSP component.
Fig. 8 shows the detailed testing support architecture for Xen-
tium DSP. The testing support architecture includes hardware/soft-
ware based co-testing mechanism, co-ordinated by a central test
access mechanism (TAM). The processor datapath is tested through
a number of different test input vectors interfaced through the
TAM. The responses from the processor datapath is then analyzed
by the test output analyzer for detecting permanent faults. To test
the memory devices built-in self-test (BIST) controller is incorpo-
rated. The BIST controller generates a number of memory access
instructions in random locations and feeds these instructions
through the TAM. The output of these instructions is then analyzed
to detect the presence of one or more permanent faults. Using such
BIST controller reduces the number of test vectors needed to beInput Test 
Vectors
(w/ compression/de-
compression)
Test Output  
Analyzer
Context 
Switching
BIST Controller BIST Output Analyzer
Test Access Mechanism
Datapath and 
Registers
(Test Vectors)
Memory
(BIST)
Tightly Coupled 
Memory (BIST)
Component To Runtime System 
Manager
Fig. 8. DeSyRe online testing support in component wrapper.stored for effective fault detection coverage for such devices. The
test vectors storage and the BIST controllers (Fig. 8) are designed
with self-testing capability to ensure fault-free testing mechanism.
More detailed description of the Xentium online testing mecha-
nism is described in [26].
Apart from Xentium DSP a number of different other compo-
nents are also being designed with appropriate testing support
architectures. For example, error detection and correction coding
is being incorporated in the network-on-chip (NoC) components
with dynamic testing scheduling, RISC (SiMS) processors are being
designed with instruction retry architecture [19], coarse- and ﬁne-
grained reconﬁgurable logics are being designed with appropriate
redundancy logics, etc. To achieve the best possible permanent
fault detection coverage, trade-off between the coverage and com-
plexity of testing is currently being extensively studied.4. DeSyRe Mechanisms for Fault Tolerance
The proposed framework is expected to cope with permanent,
transient and intermittent faults using the above described logical
layers and physical parts. Table 1 summarizes the DeSyRe mecha-
nisms to detect and correct various fault types.
Permanent faults (defects), due to design, manufacturing or
aging effects, are detected and diagnosed in DeSyRe through online
testing scheduled centrally by the runtime system or distributed
by self-checking mechanisms at each component. Hardware recon-
ﬁguration of the defective part is the ﬁrst choice for correction; this
involves isolation, and replacement of the defective part, per-
formed by Middleware with possible high-level decisions made
at the runtime system layer. When reconﬁguration is not possible
the tasks scheduled in the defective parts of the system are
re-scheduled in other available components. To economize system
Table 1
DeSyRe techniques for tolerating various types of faults.
Fault Type DeSyRe Detection mechanisms DeSyRe Correction mechanisms
Permanent  Online testing
 Self-checking components
 Coarse- or ﬁne-grain Reconﬁguration (via Middleware, and runtime
optimizations)
 Task migration (possibly using alternative task descriptions)
 Component sharing
 Graceful degradation (through the above mechanisms, and with the
assistance of runtime system optimizations)
Transient  Software error detection codes (used together with adaptive
checkpoints)
 Self-checking components
 Adaptive check-pointing (i.e. rollback and recover).
– Application-aware
– Adapted to fault density
 Self-correcting mechanisms at the components (i.e. ECCs)
Intermittent  Same as transient, with some additional software mechanism to dis-
tinguish them from the transient faults
 Task migration (possibly using alternative task descriptions)
 System Reconﬁguration and Runtime optimizations
 Adaptive check-pointing (i.e. rollback and recover)
988 I. Sourdis et al. /Microprocessors and Microsystems 37 (2013) 981–1001resources, component sharing may be possible at the cost of
performance degradation. The above will be achieved based on
the graceful degradation policies of the system.
Transient faults (soft-errors) are detected in DeSyRe either cen-
trally at the software-level using error detection (and correction)
codes or locally at the components using checkers. Check-pointing
mechanisms will be used to rollback to a known good state and re-
cover from faults. Check-pointing will be adaptive to the applica-
tion requirements and the fault density (i.e. adaptive frequency
and placement of checkpoints) for energy efﬁciency. At the compo-
nent level self-correcting mechanisms may be able to correct a
sub-set of faults.
In DeSyRe, intermittent faults (i.e. periodic transient faults) are
distinguished from transient faults in order to treat these differ-
ently. To do so, we add to the transient-fault detection mechanisms
extra functionality to determine whether a fault is repeated. Then,
task migration to other available components or hardware recon-
ﬁgurations can be used for correction, while adaptive check-point-
ing and context switching mechanisms will be required to rollback
and recover or to migrate a task.
Fault tolerance is a property that can be implemented in differ-
ent ways. Redundancy (at different levels) is certainly the most
popular way to achieve fault tolerance – however it is not the only
way. For example, fault forecasting techniques (like memory
scrubbing) inspect component sub-parts to ﬁnd faults before they
become failures; in case they detect a fault, they can repair (or
reconﬁgure) the component sub-part and then avoid the failure.
Fault repair is also a very common approach to achieve fault toler-
ance: in that sense, a CPU reset after a transient fault is a very
straightforward way to achieve tolerance to transient faults.
In DeSyRe, the basic concept is to ‘‘instrument’’ or ‘‘wrap’’ the
unreliable components and sub-components by local fault supervi-
sors (FS) to become self-aware of their faults and be able to dis-
patch this information to the fault-free part.
We discuss next some speciﬁc fault-detection and correction
mechanisms used in the DeSyRe applications SoCs.
4.1. Software Implemented Fault Tolerance
Central Software implemented fault tolerance in DeSyRe will be
performed using the application check-pointing technique. The ba-
sic aim of this technique is to save the system state when no fault
is detected or to roll back when one or more faults are detected. In
this way, applications can overcome the impact of transient faults
effectively. However, since this technique adds regular check-
pointing or rollback intervals with the original execution times,
performance overhead is caused. To incorporate a low-cost appli-
cation check-pointing mechanism, DeSyRe will dynamically adapt
the check-pointing frequency depending on the applicationreliability requirements during runtime. Such check-pointing
mechanism will be implemented in DeSyRe using inter-component
communication as shown in Fig. 4. Upon detection of one or more
faults, the HW fault detection unit will communicate the approxi-
mate number and frequency of these faults to the Fault Analyzer
unit within the software implemented fault tolerance manager.
Using this information, the Fault Analyzer will then estimate and
communicate the component reliability to the runtime system
manager to adapt the check-pointing frequency accordingly.
To date signiﬁcant progress has been made towards implement-
ing software based fault detection and tolerance in DeSyRe. The
fault detection and tolerance are both carried out through a soft-
ware modiﬁcation technique, followed by its evaluation in terms
of performance and memory footprint costs. Fig. 9(a) shows the
system architecture based on the Xentium DSP processor [7]
enabling fault detection through software modiﬁcation and correc-
tion through application check-pointing, while Fig. 9 (b) shows the
software modiﬁcation based technique employed on this system
architecture. As can be seen, to enable application check-pointing
technique, Xentium incorporates a fault tolerant memory (sufﬁ-
ciently error correction coded) interfaced via the memory access
(DMA) unit (Fig. 9(a)).
With the given system architecture (Fig. 9(a), fault detection
and tolerance is carried out using Software Modiﬁcation Aided
transient eRror detection Technique (SMART) in three steps. In
the ﬁrst step, high-level source-to-source conversion is carried
out to replace the original data types to error detection enabler
types. Such conversion essentially generates duplicate copies of
the data and their computations to compare and detect the pres-
ence of transient faults. This is then followed by a low-level (i.e.
assembly-level) software modiﬁcation step to incorporate dynamic
signature comparisons to detect transient faults in the software
control ﬂow during branch instructions. In this step, each branch
label is preceded by inserting extra instructions to save the func-
tion of label address (sb) in a temporary register. Then, further
instructions are also inserted after each label to save the function
of current label address (sa) in another register. The previous and
the new register values (i.e. sb and sa) are then compared to ﬁnd
any possible differences and thereby presence of one or more
faults. Upon fault detection, rollback routines are initiated to avoid
illegal control ﬂow.
To control the potential performance overhead due to duplica-
tion of data and their computations, SMART incorporates two dif-
ferent inputs generated by the application proﬁler (Fig. 9(b)):
data usage proﬁle and normalized usage threshold (UNT). The data
usage proﬁle gives the structured organization of the various vari-
ables and constants used in an application, together with their
usage statistics. Using such data usage statistics, the tool only
duplicates the original data types and operations of chosen
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Fig. 9. (a) DeSyRe system architecture enabling check-pointing mechanism in Xentium DSP, and (b) Software modiﬁcation technique for transient fault detection and
tolerance in Xentium DSP system.
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threshold (i.e. UNP UNT). Normalized threshold usage (UNT) is cal-
culated as a ratio of a variable’s usage count to the maximum usage
of any other variable. Details of how data/register usage is gener-
ated can be found in [25].
With the detected faults in ﬁrst two steps (Fig. 9(b)), fault toler-
ance or correction is performed using software implemented appli-
cation check-pointing technique enabled through further software
modiﬁcation as shown in Fig. 9. The technique employs a hand-
shake based routine between DMA and processor units to initiate
the check-pointing mechanism (since hardware interrupt or timing
based supervision is not featured in the DSP processor).
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed fault detection
and tolerance technique (Fig. 9(b)), a number of experiments are
carried out in Xentium ISS environment [7] using different sig-
nal/image/data conditioning and processing benchmark applica-
tions to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed SMART tool
with system architecture (Fig. 9(a)). To demonstrate the effective-
ness of the modiﬁed software description, initially full data
duplication with UNT = 0 is assumed. For each application, an
approximate total of 5000 transient errors are injected in consecu-
tive runs using single-event upset (SEU) based model (for fault
injection details, see [26]). An arbitrary error probability of 1012
(SEU per cycle) is assumed. Similar error injection has also been
carried out in [15].
Table 2 shows the impact of SEU injections on these benchmark
applications. The average execution cycles per application for a
given test input sequence is shown in column 2, while the
percentage of injected SEUs in different instructions are shown in
columns 3–6 (determined after application proﬁling through
output trace followed by error injection). Columns 7–8 compare
the percentage of incorrect executions without and with SMART
technique.
From Table 2 twomajor observations can be made. Firstly, it can
be seen that depending on the nature of applications the percent-
age SEUs injected in different instructions can vary. However, the
injected SEUs show a general trend of higher SEUs being injected
in load/store (i.e. LDW/STW) and arithmetic/logical instructions
(which is expected as DSP applications are highly computationally
intensive in nature). For example, for memory and computationally
intensive JPEG application the highest number (41%) of SEUs are
injected in the load/store memory instructions, while about 34%
SEUs are injected in the arithmetic/logical instructions. The branchinstructions are subjected to the next highest percentage of SEUs
injected, which varies depending on the nature of application.
With the given SEUs injected, the second observation is that pro-
posed SMART technique can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of
incorrect executions (by up to 80% in the case of FIR application)
through software implemented error detection and tolerance tech-
nique (Fig. 9(b)). This is because, proposed technique can effec-
tively detect the SEUs injected and mitigate the impact of these
SEUs through application check-pointing, enabled through soft-
ware modiﬁcation (in SMART-CP). However, note that up to 15%
of the cases can still lead to incorrect executions (in the case of
WHT application) using SMART technique. This underlines the lim-
itations of the proposed software-only technique.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of error detection through
SMART technique, Fig. 10 shows the effective percentage of
masked (i.e. errors with no effect), detected (both by SMART-ED
and SMART-SC) and undetected SEUs through SMART technique
in the benchmark applications with UNT = 0 (i.e. full duplication
of all data). From Fig. 10, two observations can be made. First
observation is that maximum number of injected SEUs (up to
74% for WHT application) are detected through the proposed tech-
nique, while 17% SEUs can get masked, summing to an effective to-
tal of 91% errors being either detected or masked. Out of the
detected SEUs, up to 85% are detected through the SMART-ED,
while the rest of the SEUs are detected by SMART-SC. This is ex-
pected as SEUs injected in load/store and arithmetic/logical
instruction dominate (Table 2). Note that up to 17% of the SEUs
cannot be detected depending on where SEUs are injected.
The inclusion of data duplication, dynamic signature generation
and check-pointing through software modiﬁcation imply perfor-
mance overheads. This is because SMART-ED generates controlled
repetitions of computations through normalized usage threshold,
UNT, while SMART-SC requires signature generation and compari-
son cycles as well (Fig. 9(b)). Furthermore, SMART-CP requires pro-
cessor to software-implemented check-pointing, which incurs
further overheads.
To explore the performance overheads incurred due by SMART
generated software modiﬁcation, Fig. 11(a) shows the normalized
performance overheads of different benchmark applications with
varied duplication control through normalized usage threshold
(UNT). An approximate check-pointing interval of 106 cycles is cho-
sen arbitrarily for the applications in comprehensive error injec-
tion environment. As can be seen SMART technique can result in
Table 2
Benchmark applications with injected SEUs in different instructions.
Application Avg. Cycles/
run
% SEUs in STW/
LDW
% SEUs in
Branch
% SEUs in Arith/
Logical
% SEUs in
Others
% Incorrect execution (w/o
SMART)
% Incorrect execution (w/
SMART)
FIR 74,953,217 34.7 14.3 41.4 9.6 66 13
DWT 98,353,826 33.4 16.4 42.1 8.1 61 14
FFT 103,505,361 35.3 15.6 39.7 9.4 63 11
WHT 97,526,718 39.3 13.6 37.5 9.6 60 15
Viterbi 89,962,118 38.9 17.3 35.2 8.6 63 13
JPEG 311,822,971 41.3 15.9 34.5 8.3 59 12
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tion and tolerance depending on the application and its nature of
computation. For example, up to 83% performance overhead is in-
curred by Viterbi application (when all variables and data are
duplicated, i.e. UNT = 0). Note that although the proposed technique
employs duplicate storage and computations, the performance
overhead is contained. This is because the post modiﬁcation com-
pilation steps can employ instruction-level parallelism (a common
feature in high-performance DSP processors) to reduce the perfor-
mance overheads. Comparing the contributions of different SMART
steps (Fig. 9(b)), it can be seen that the highest performance over-
head (about 65% for the WHT decoding application) is caused by
SMART-ED. SMART-CP is the second largest contributor for the per-
formance overheads (with up to 13% overhead for the JPEG appli-
cation). This can, however, vary depending on the approximate
check-pointing interval assumed. SMART-SC contributes the low-
est performance overheads for the given check-pointing interval
when compared with the other steps. As expected, with higher
normalized usage threshold, the duplication in the original appli-
cation (through SMART-ED) can be controlled and the performance
overheads show a trade-off. For example, when the duplication is
only carried out for variables/constants that have more than 50%
normalized usage (i.e. UNP UNT = 0.5), the performance overhead
reduced to as low as 56% for DWT application. Similar trend can
also be observed from other applications. However, this reduction
of duplication comes with a decrease in the detection coverage as
well. For example, in the case of FIR application, the detection cov-
erage (detected and masked) can reduce to 64% when UNT = 0.5
(compared to 91% when UNT = 0).
Due to software modiﬁcation, software descriptions can also ex-
pand with increased memory footprint. Fig. 11(b) shows the com-
parative memory footprints of different applications, showing
contributions from different SMART steps. Since SMART-SC does
not use memory resources, it is not shown. As expected, SMART-
ED gives the highest memory overheads due to duplicated data
components and related comparison instructions for detection of
SEUs. Comparing the different applications, it can be seen that a
reasonable 113% memory footprint overhead is caused by SMART
technique in Viterbi and WHT applications, for example. This is
because these applications use comparatively larger amount of
data storage components (variables and data value holders) at
high-level description, which is further duplicated by the proposed
technique (SMART-ED). Further, it can also be seen that with con-
trolled duplication through SMART-ED using normalized usage
threshold, memory footprint can be reduced. This explains the
trade-off between injected software redundancy overheads in
terms of memory footprint and achievable error detection cover-
age, as expected.
Software implemented fault tolerance (SW FT) achieved
through the above technique, however, has limitations of not being
able to tolerate all possible faults, including permanent faults.
Hence, SW FT will use various fault syndromes, such as double roll-
back, double watchdog timeout events and acceptance tests, to
generate permanent fault syndromes. Upon detection of such syn-
dromes, the fault analyzer module (Fig. 4) will request the runtimesystem manager to schedule appropriate online testing. More de-
tails of online testing can be found in Sections 4 and 5.
4.2. Transient Fault Tolerance for the SiMS RISC Processor
Fault tolerance in the SiMS processor is facilitated through
duplicating the instructions on-demand using a single-event upset
based fault model [19].Whenever a sequence of instructions is
decided (on-demand) to be protected via instruction duplication,
a dedicated register is set using a custom instruction. When de-
coded instructions are protected with the above mechanism, a
hardware instruction-duplication unit duplicates this instruction
in the next cycle. The result of the original instruction is stored
in a dedicated register and, if the result of the ‘‘original’’ and the
‘‘duplicated’’ instruction are the same, the result is committed. If
the results differ, then a fault is detected and the pipeline is
ﬂushed. The error is corrected by re-fetching the ‘‘original’’ instruc-
tions and resuming execution from the point of failure. An example
is given in Fig. 12, where all control-ﬂow instructions are made
fault tolerant and, therefore, instruction A is duplicated.
The SiMS fault tolerance and its corresponding area, power,
performance and energy overheads have been evaluated using a
custom fault injector and a low-power encryption cipher, suitable
for ultra-low-power systems, as benchmark. A number of duplica-
tion policies, duplicating none, control-ﬂow instructions (jumps,
branches), all control-ﬂow related instructions (includes code-seg-
ments for e.g. loop-counter evaluation) or all instructions, has been
devised to support various fault-tolerance requirements. In short,
the previous list of policies offers increasingly higher fault toler-
ance. Fig. 13 depicts the percentage of injected soft faults manifest-
ing as (control-ﬂow) soft-errors for each of the duplication policies.
It is shown that, even when no fault tolerance is added, only a small
percentage (14.7%)manifests as a soft error, as themajority of faults
are injected in idle parts of the processor. As expected, a duplication
policy offering higher fault tolerance increases the number of cor-
rected transient faults and, in case all instructions are duplicated,
full fault tolerance to single-cycle transient faults is guaranteed.
Besides, by injecting duplicated instructions in a consequent
cycle after the original, the switching activity of the core is lowered
(due to less bit toggles), thus minimizing the power-consumption
overhead. Furthermore, by allowing duplicate instructions to be
executed instead of scheduled NOPs, the increase in execution time
is minimal. The technique comes at an overhead of area (+23%)
and, when offering the highest degree of soft-fault tolerance,
power consumption (+17.5%), execution time (+42%) and energy
consumption (+77%).
4.3. Dual Core Lock-Step (DCLS) Architecture based Fault Detection
One of the standard architectures used in the reliability and
functional safety ﬁeld is the Dual Core Lock-Step, i.e. two symmet-
rical processing units are contained on one die. The processing
units run duplicate operations in lockstep (or delayed by a ﬁxed
period) and the results are compared. Any mismatch results in
an error condition and usually a reset condition. However, for the
Fig. 10. SMART detection efﬁciency.
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standard implementations of DCLS are not able to identify which
one of the two CPUs is faulty; consequently, even if the fault is in
the slave CPU (so it is not a real critical scenario) the system is
typically put in safe state and the availability of the system is com-
pletely lost. On the contrary, the ‘‘smart’’ DCLS architecture pro-
posed in DeSyRe is an advanced solution to detect and identify
failures, which replaces the standard comparator used in the tradi-
tional scheme and is able to determine which of the two cores is
the faulty one, exploiting micro-architectural information ex-
tracted from the cores. As illustrated in 14, this new Advanced
Comparator is an IP sitting in between the two processors (master
and slave) taking control of the bus. It embeds cycle-by-cycle com-
parators, assuring the same basic functionality described for the
standard DCLS, and it removes DCLS limitations adding features
basically aimed to:Fig. 11. (a) SMART performance overheads, and detect which of the two cores is failing, if possible preserving
the availability of the system (Identiﬁcation Coverage);
 provide failure information to allow failure control techniques;
 swap the CPU master with the CPU slave when the default mas-
ter is damaged.
The ‘‘smart’’ DCLS has been implemented for ARM Cortex-R4
and Cortex-R5 CPUs but it can support all different types of CPU
including the Xentium. The implementation addresses not only
the inner portion of the CPU core but also outer structures like ca-
ches (see Figs. 14–16).
Efﬁciency in the detection, identiﬁcation and repair of faults has
been measured by means of a fault injection campaign on both
permanent and transient faults. Faults coverage results of the
‘‘smart’’ DCLS architecture are summarized in the following table
(see Table 3).(b) SMART memory footprint overheads.
Fig. 12. Transient fault tolerance in RISC (SiMS) processor using instruction
duplication and retry technique.
Fig. 13. Soft-error manifestation in the SiMS core.
Fig. 14. The advanced comparator in the DCLS scheme.
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ability to quickly detect, isolate and identify the fault that may af-
fect one of the two CPU cores, so guaranteeing the faster reaction
and reconﬁguration. In general, as shown in the next ﬁgure, each
of the operation steps of ‘‘smart’’ DCLS can be associated to a time
interval:
 DTI = Detection Time Interval
 ISTI = Isolation Time Interval
 IDTI = Identiﬁcation Time Interval
 RTI = Restoration Time Interval
Performance results achieved by ‘‘smart’’ DCLS are shown in the
table (see Table 4).
The total overhead in terms of gate counts of ‘‘smart’’ DCLS
(including also 4 instances of the ‘‘CCF detector’’ described in
paragraph E) is in the range of 150–200 Kgates depending on the
speciﬁc CPU.
4.4. Component Wrapper
Typically, in a safety–critical system, the alarm information
shall be communicated to the System Supervisor (the fault-free
part of the DeSyRe system) using a dedicated Hardware fault
detection wrapper and a communication channel implemented
using separate safe interconnections and transporting diagnostic
information. This way the diagnostic and mission channels are
kept separate, resulting in a more safe and robust system according
to norm recommendations. This dedicated bus connects all the
detectors implied in system. Moreover, having a dedicated com-
munication channel to convey diagnostic information results in a
faster transfer of critical alarms toward the system supervisor.
The HW fault detection wrapper provides to the fault-free part
the following information:
 Alarm_Error. These alarms are related to the dangerous faults
 Alarm_Warning. These alarms are related to event near danger-
ous fault (e.g. Common Cause Failure detector provides warning
signals which indicate that the silicon behavior got closer to
violating constraints)
 Alarm_Info. These signals provide information about the coher-
ency of the results in order to identify problems inside the
detector.
4.5. Common Cause Failure (CCF) Detection
Detection of dependent failures and especially common-cause
failures is crucial to allow identiﬁcation and proper repair. In fact,
common-cause failures are one of the most important failure modes
when diagnostic mechanisms are implemented in the same silicon
device. There are different types of common cause failures, like
temperature variation and noise into power supply and the clock.
It is well known that high temperature operation compromises
long-term reliability and impacts circuit performance such as the
timing characteristics of the circuit, causing timing violations. Sim-
ilar timing effects can be obtained in case of noise affecting power
supply and clock network. In order to avoid the standard measures
to detect common-cause failure, the solution studied and imple-
mented in DeSyRe consists in a CCF detector which can be instan-
tiated according to the position of the expected redundancies. The
CCF detector is a completely independent checker. It includes spe-
cial structures used to understand when the circuit approaches
timing-violating operating conditions. In order to make the CCF
detector sensible to CCF problems, some internal paths are
conﬁgurable during synthesis (e.g. by means of delay chain) to
achieve the same critical path than the critical path in the IP underdetection. The internal paths are redundant to distinguish real CCF
problems from problems of the CCF detector itself. The CCF can be
used in conjunction with Dual Core Lock-Step architectures (DCLS)
explained in the previous section.5. DeSyRe Reconﬁgurable Substrate
The DeSyRe framework relies signiﬁcantly on a ﬂexible and
dynamically reconﬁgurable hardware substrate to isolate, replace
and (when possible) correct design and manufacturing defects as
well as other permanent faults due to aging. In previous works,
the design choice was either coarse- or ﬁne-grain granularity of
substitutable units; these are units that can be replaced when
defective. In the ﬁrst case, the substitutable unit can be an entire
sub-component (e.g. a microprocessor’s pipeline stage), while in
the latter case an FPGA logic cell. There are tradeoffs between these
two alternatives. Coarse-grain approaches are less defect-tolerant
– fewer defects can have large impact to the system – but lead to
solutions that are more power and silicon efﬁcient. Fine-grain
fault
DTI ISTI
Fault detected 
System
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Faulty com
p. identified 
System
 restored 
RTI 
System 
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System not available 
Fig. 15. The operation steps of ‘‘smart’’ DCLS (and related timing).
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Supervisor SafeChannel
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Fig. 16. Communication between HW fault detection wrapper of a component and the Supervisor at the fault-free part of the DeSyRe system.
Table 3
Coverage results of the ‘‘smart’’ DCLS.
Coverage Value
(%)
Note
Diagnostic
coverage
99.9 Coverage is guaranteed also for faults that
could affect the small portion of ‘‘smart’’
DCLS that could directly affect the mission
function (e.g. the CPU switch)
Dependent failures
detection
bIC = 23 Achieved thanks to the Common-Cause
Failure detector (see paragraph E). bIC is an
semi-quantitative method introduced by IEC
61508 standard to measure dependent
failures coverage
Identiﬁcation
coverage by HW
60
Identiﬁcation
coverage by
HW + SW
90 Achieved by running a SW Test Library
Latent faults
coverage
90 Latent faults coverage of ‘‘smart’’ DCLS
stand-alone
Table 4
Performance results of the ‘‘smart’’ DCLS.
Step Value Note
DTI 3 clock cycles The fault is detected as soon as it appears at
CPU output
ISTI 20 clock cycles
IDTI 300 ls @ 160 MHz Average IDTI when fault is identiﬁed by
‘‘smart’’ DCLS HW
2 ms @ 160 MHz Average IDTI when fault is identiﬁed by
‘‘smart’’ DCLS SW
RTI 150 clock cycles This is the case in which a reset is not
needed.
Depends on the overall
circuit architecture
This is the case in which a reset is needed.
The reset time depends on the speciﬁc MCU
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FPGA-like substrate introduces performance, power, and cost
overheads.
One of the primary challenges in the DeSyRe project is to inves-
tigate the architecture of the underlying hardware substrate for the
DeSyRe SoC. DeSyRe explores a granularity mix of ﬁne- and
coarse-grain underlying hardware in order to provide increased
defect-tolerance without giving away signiﬁcant parts of the sys-
tem performance and power efﬁciency. Fig. 17 depicts such an
example with two DeSyRe RISC components. In this example, each
RISC processor is divided in smaller sub-components (imple-
mented in ﬁxed hardware), i.e. pipeline stages, functional units,
etc., surrounded by reconﬁgurable interconnects/wires. In theabsence of defects, the sub-components ‘S’ will form the RISC com-
ponent. However, in case a sub-component is defective, it can be
isolated using the reconﬁgurable interconnects, and subsequently
be replaced either by an identical unused neighboring sub-compo-
nent (S), or by a functionally equivalent instance (S0) implemented
in ﬁne-grain reconﬁgurable hardware.5.1. Beneﬁts and overheads of reconﬁgurability
In order to have a better understanding of aforementioned
tradeoffs, an analytical study has been performed for an array of
processors such as the ones depicted in Fig. 17. In the presence
of permanent faults, we evaluated 5 different cases of processor ar-
rays with ﬁne-grain and/or coarse-grain reconﬁgurablity compared
to no reconﬁgurability at all. In this study, it is assumed that a ﬁxed
silicon area is available which can accommodate a certain number
of cores; as expected different choice or reconﬁgurability has
SS SS S
SS SS S
s s s
Sub-component/ 
pipe-stage etc.
Alternative 
implemen-
tation of s
Fine-grain Reconf. HW
Fine-grain Reconf. HW
LUT
RISC
RISC
Fig. 17. The novel DeSyRe ﬂexible/reconﬁgurable hardware substrate.
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in the given area. The 5 cases of multicore arrays are as follows:
1. A baseline multiprocessor array design with no reconﬁguration
which ﬁts 9 cores.
2. Coarse-grain reconﬁgurable array providing stage-level recon-
ﬁgurability, which ﬁts 6 cores.
3. Fine- and Coarse-Grain design, similar to the one depicted in
Fig. 17, which ﬁts 4 cores and a ﬁne-grain substrate that can
be used to conﬁgure 4 pipeline stages.
4. Restricted coarse-grain reconﬁgurable array which provides
cores with interchangeable stages within two clusters of 4
and 3 cores, respectively. This constraint reduces the area over-
head ﬁtting 7 cores in the given area.
5. Similar to the previous creating clusters of pairs of cores, allows
ﬁtting 8 cores in the given area, although restricting the options
of reconﬁguration.
Considering a defect rate that varies between 10% and 90%
probability to have a defect in a pipeline stage, we measured the
probability of each one of the above cases to provide at least 3
working cores. Fig. 18 shows the result of this evaluation. For
low defect rates the probability of delivering 3 working cores is al-
most 1 for all cases. However, as the defect rate increases, and
above 40% chance to have a defect in a pipeline stage, the reconﬁg-
urable cases are more defect tolerant than the baseline. More
speciﬁcally, the simple coarse-grain reconﬁgurability may offer
up to 10 times better probability than the baseline, the clustered
coarse-grain approach is the best guaranteeing at least 80% proba-
bility to have 3 working cores even in very high defect rates. Final-
ly, the mix of ﬁne and coarse grain reconﬁgurable substrate is
somewhere in between the other reconﬁguration options mainly
due to its excessive area overhead which allows to ﬁt only 4 cores
in the given area.
For our experiments, we considered as a case study processor
the SiMS RISC of the DeSyRe SoCs. For this example, the 40% defect
rate corresponds roughly to 4 defects per million transistors. Mod-
eling aging effects in 32 nm technology it is estimated that up to 2–
6 transistors per million can be damaged in 5 years SoC lifetime
only due to the NBTI (Negative Bias Temperature Instability). In
this modeling, temperatures 90–130 C were considered, and a
25–95% duty cycle, while a transistor is considered damaged whenhaving less than 40% of its initial voltage threshold. In general, we
can state that the area overhead of the considered reconﬁgurability
varies between 10% to 2, while the performance overheads are
between 15% and 50% in the coarse grain case and about 5 in
the ﬁne-grain case.
5.2. Dynamic Reconﬁguration
In order to utilize the reconﬁguration capabilities mentioned
above, the Middleware performs dynamic reconﬁguration based
on the decisions made by the System Optimizations module of
the Runtime System. More speciﬁcally, the System Optimizations
module decides the appropriate conﬁguration of each component
based on various objectives and system constraints (i.e. real-time
constraints, power consumption requirements) and sends a re-
quest to the Reconﬁguration Management module to conﬁgure a
component of the system.
An example of coarse grain reconﬁguration between two iden-
tical components is given below, referring to Fig. 13. Both compo-
nents have faulty stages in the coarse grain part and cannot be
utilized under the existing conﬁguration. The System Optimiza-
tions module sends a request to the Middleware to conﬁgure both
components by bypassing faulty parts in order to recover a compo-
nent that ensembles correct functionality. In general, the steps for
the hardware reconﬁguration process are:
1. The System Optimizations module decides the appropriate
conﬁguration of the components, given the existing faults and
system constraints.
2. The System Optimizations module requests from the Reconﬁg-
uration Management to perform conﬁguration of the two com-
ponents and transmits a high level description of the required
component conﬁguration.
3. The Reconﬁguration Management module processes the above
request, notiﬁes the wrapper of the target components about
the scheduled reconﬁguration, and provides the required infor-
mation (i.e. conﬁguration stream) to the wrapper (and speciﬁ-
cally to the Component Reconﬁguration module – see Fig. 4).
4. The Component Reconﬁguration modules of the target compo-
nents are then responsible for:
 Loading the new conﬁguration stream into the components.
 Checking the status of the new conﬁguration.
5. The wrapper passes the status of the reconﬁguration to the
Reconﬁguration Management module and the Reconﬁguration
Management module passes on the message about successful
or not reconﬁguration to the System Optimizations module.
6. Baseline Implementation Platform
The DeSyRe applications are implemented on a heterogeneous
multi-core SoC template depicted in Fig. 19. The DeSyRe baseline
SoCs consist of multiple heterogeneous processing cores, such as
Xentium DSP cores [7], on-chip memory blocks, RISC processors,
and custom accelerator blocks interconnected by a Network-on-
Chip (NoC). Fault-tolerance extensions to existing NoC approaches
[8,9] as implemented in [10,11], respectively, are considered in
DeSyRe. The heterogeneous baseline SoC is implemented in the
fault-prone part of the DeSyRe system. Moreover, part of the De-
SyRe system is realized on a separate general-purpose processor,
which is considered to be the fault-free part of the system.
In the next section, two (medical) applications are described
that are implemented based on the DeSyRe SoC framework: The
artiﬁcial-cerebellum SoC consists of a RISC processor, a Custom-
IP and multiple Xentium processors to perform the computation-
ally intensive tasks of modeling brain-cells. The artiﬁcial pancreas
will be more lightweight; it includes a RISC processor for control, a
Fig. 18. Effect of introducing Coarse/ﬁne grain reconﬁgurability: Performance comparison for ﬁve different scenarios of a Multiprocessor array.
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Fig. 20. Xentium DSP tile with NoC interface.
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sor for encryption and data-logging.
In the remainder of this section we describe in more detail each
component of the baseline implementation platform.
6.1. Reconﬁgurable fault-tolerant NoC
The main communication infrastructure in the DeSyRe SoC is
provided by a NoC. All Xentium processing tiles, processor, mem-
ory resources and other accelerator cores are accessible via the
NoC. Moreover, the NoC can be used to (re)conﬁgure cores in the
SoC, and to access scan chains (at run-time for on-line testing)
and memory Built-In Self-Test units of e.g. the Xentium tiles.
A key feature of NoCs is their predictable performance. Besides,
well-designed NoCs allow disabling inactive parts of the network,
which is essential for energy-efﬁciency and dependability. With re-
spect to creating a reliable and fault-tolerant SoC architecture, the
NoC is a crucial building block. Different levels of reliability can be
identiﬁed in the SoC, which require large involvement of the NoC:
 On the SoC level, processor tile errors andmemory tile errors can
occur. Upon errors in the SoC, defective processor cores or
memories in the SoC will be disabled and another (reconﬁgura-
ble) processor core or memory part will be used to (re)execute a
task; reconﬁguring processor cores in the multi-core SoC or
using different dedicated memory parts requires that data
channels in the NoC are re-routed.
 On the NoC level, connection errors, channel errors, router errors
or link errors can occur which are due to errors induced in the
NoC elements.
On the system-level, the most important requirement of the
NoC is that data can be re-routed in the multi-core SoC. Hence,
the routing mechanisms should be based on dynamic routing
schemes in the NoC routers. Upon detection of e.g. core errors,
the system should be capable of re-routing channels from a source
tile to a different destination tile in the multi-core SoC. Also, on the
system-level, the individual building blocks of the SoC should pro-
vide means to detect that e.g. an error occurred in a processing tile
of the multi-core SoC. After detection of an error on system-level,
run-time software should take immediate action in order to recon-
ﬁgure the multi-core SoC.
6.2. Xentium DSP
The Xentium core is a 32-bit ﬁxed-point DSP core designed for
high-performance embedded signal processing. The VLIW architec-
ture of the Xentium features 10 parallel execution slots and in-
cludes support for Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) and
zero-overhead loops. High-performance and energy-efﬁciency are
achieved by optimizing parallel operation at instruction level.
The core modules of the Xentium tile are the Xentium core, the
tightly coupled data memory and a NoC interface as shown in
the block diagram in Fig. 20. A default instance of the Xentium
DSP tile contains 16-kB tightly coupled data memory and 8 kB
instruction cache. The size of the data and instruction memories
is conﬁgurable at design-time of the multi-core SoC.
6.3. SiMS Processor
The SiMS core is a MIPS-like, 5-stage (Fetch, Decode, Execute,
Memory, Writeback) processor, optimized for low-power opera-
tion. Low-power consumption is currently achieved by a minimal-
istic design (e.g. by omitting advanced architectural features such
as branch predictor of forwarding unit) but ongoing efforts focus
on architecture- and compiler-based enhancements. The processorhas 16 32-bit registers, a 16 kB Instruction Memory (16-bit ISA, 24
instructions) and a 16kB Data Memory (32-bit data words). The
SiMS core is integrated as one of the DeSyRe IP modules in the De-
SyRe SoC, depicted in Fig. 19.6.4. Custom-IP blocks
The Custom-IP blocks for the two applications each consist of
one main computing unit and several smaller hardware blocks,
used for data-buffering and communication to and from the NoC.
The computing hardware blocks are implemented on a Virtex-6
LX 550-T with ﬂoating-point components from the FPLibrary
[20], and are optimized for area. The custom-IP blocks are inte-
grated in the DeSyRe SoC template in the DeSyRe IP place-holders.
The artiﬁcial-cerebellum compute block is a custom hardware
implementation of the ‘‘soma’’ task (see Section 7). It is a dataﬂow
circuit with complex ﬂoating-point arithmetic operations such as
exponent, divisions and multiplications. It occupies 2577 FPGA
slices and has a latency is 127 clock cycles.
The artiﬁcial-pancreas compute block is a custom hardware
implementation of the insulin rate task (see Section 7). It is a
state-machine controller with ﬂoating-point multiplications and
additions. Depending on the input values its latency varies with
a maximum of 42 clock cycles, while its area cost is 659 slices.6.5. Memory tiles
The multi-core SoC is equipped with (on-chip) memory tiles,
connected to the NoC. In Fig. 19 an SRAM memory tile as well as
an SDRAM controller are integrated in the SoC template. Depend-
ing on the implemented application, the system designer could
integrate on-chip or off-chip memory resources. It is key for scal-
able multi-core systems-on-chip to have sufﬁcient distributed
memory available in the SoC in order to avoid bottlenecks through
single shared resources. In DeSyRe, the distributed memory in the
SoC will adapt multiple functions, such as storage of DSP execution
binary, elastic buffers, storage of checkpoints, storage of (interme-
diate) processing results, etc.
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the NoC. In the course of the DeSyRe project, existing NoC ap-
proaches [8,9] will be considered and used to build a fault-tolerant
NoC that satisﬁes the given requirements on tolerating SoC-level
and NoC-level errors. Moreover, the DSP cores and memory tiles
in the SoC will be extended with local checkers and (on-line) test
wrappers to monitor the healthiness of the cores in the SoC at
run-time. The ultimate goal is to have a reliable NoC that can be
used for application data communication as well as for transferring
(on-line) test information, such as test patterns, from test pattern
generators to the test circuitry of a core, or to transfer (on-line) test
results from the component-under-test (CuT) to a response ana-
lyzer. The test wrappers will be developed according to the
IEEE1500 standard and are accessible by the NoC.
7. Applications
The DeSyRe framework will be applied to two medical SoCs,
namely an artiﬁcial cerebellum and an artiﬁcial pancreas. Both
applications are being developed by Neurasmus BV, one of the De-
SyRe-project industrial partners. Currently, preliminary prototypes
of the two applications have been implemented and validated on
an FPGA board. In the second phase of the project, these two sys-
tems will be enhanced with the fault-tolerance features being
developed under the DeSyRe project.
Although both DeSyRe medical applications exhibit high reli-
ability requirements, the artiﬁcial-pancreas system is radically dif-
ferent from the artiﬁcial cerebellum, a difference which will help to
demonstrate the diversity and ﬂexibility of the DeSyRe framework.
The artiﬁcial cerebellum system requires signiﬁcant processing of
complex mathematical operations in many concurrent tasks. On
the contrary, the artiﬁcial pancreas requires – by comparison –
few computations for processing and controlling sensors and actu-
ators, and for interfacing (security, communication, compression)
to a treating physician or the patient. It requires, however, more
rigorous closed-loop control, and should be ultra-low-power and
adaptive to new treatment descriptions.
7.1. Artiﬁcial Cerebellum
Neurasmus is developing an artiﬁcial, real-time, cerebellar medi-
cal MPSoC for rescuing damaged parts of an actual, biological brain
suffering from various brain diseases stemming from loss of senso-
rimotor control, such as calcium-channelopathies, fragile-x andFD1 FD2 FD3 FD4
FD5
DENDRITE
FS1
Evoked
current
(Iapp)
H current K current Ca current Calcium Calcium Po
Dendrite-Soma Current 
IO-
Neighbors’
current
(Ic)
Fig. 21. Block diagram of the three-compartmentautism. The mid-term goal of Neurasmus is the development of a
portable, artiﬁcial-cerebellum unit which can be carried to a home
environment for patient use or to a lab environment for clinical
experiments with the purpose of rescuing (i.e. replacing) parts of
a failed or failing biological brain.
An artiﬁcial cerebellum effectively is a closed-loop-control sys-
tem which will entail massive processing tasks as well as real-time
interfacing to multiple recorded (input) and stimulated (output)
neural structures. In its ﬁrst generation, it is expected to be porta-
ble and has the following requirements:
 high reliability due to its medical application;
 high throughput (for replacing a large number of biological
neurons);
 low latency (for ‘‘real-brain-time’’ processing);
 power efﬁciency for portability; and
 adaptability to different input patterns.
(1) The Inferior-Olive model
Within the DeSyRe project, Neurasmus has developed a proto-
type system that can accurately simulate one of the main struc-
tures of the olivocerebellar loop in the brain, i.e. the inferior
olive. Neurons in the inferior olive are tightly coupled and produce
synchronous and constant oscillations as well as controlled spikes
that are believed to be essential for the ﬁne-tuned motor-control
ability of the cerebellar cortex. The inferior-olive model we have
implemented has been originally developed by de Gruijl [22],
one of our collaborators at the Netherlands Institute for Neurosci-
ence. The model is an extension of the earlier model published by
Schweighofer et al. [23] and is based on Hodgkin–Huxley differen-
tial equations [24]. These equations describe in detail the electrical
activity that results from the combination of external changes in
the electrical potential and the internal concentrations of the main
chemical components involved in the transmission of neural-sig-
nals: calcium, potassium and sodium. The model divides the neu-
ron into three anatomical compartments: dendrites, soma and
axon. The soma is the cell body and the dendrites are extensions
of the soma that receive the electro-chemical signals coming from
other neurons. The axon is the neuron tail that transmits the elec-
trical signals to other neurons. For every compartment, a few
chemical channels are present in the model so as to contribute to
the total compartment potential, as shown in Fig. 21. Furthermore,
the computational model operates in a pipeline fashion to allow for
the concurrent execution of the three compartments. In order toFA1 FA2
FA3
SOMA AXON
FS2 FS3 FS4
FS5
tassium (n/p) Sodium (fast) Potassium Sodium Potassium
cell
Soma Axon Current Axon Voltage (Va) 
model of a single inferior-olive neuron cell.
Evoked 
current 
(Iapp)
Cell-Axon 
Voltage 
(Va)
IO-network
IO-network controller
NI
Xentium
NI
SiMS
NI NI
Xentium
NI NI NI
Memory
Custom-IP
NI
Xentium
Memory
Xentium
N
oC
/AH
B Bridge
Leon2
Peri-
pherals
(a) (b)
Fig. 22. Block diagram of (a) the IO-Network model and its mapping, and (b) onto the MPSoC architecture.
Table 5
Proﬁling of the three IO-cell compartments on the Xentium simulator.
Dendrite Soma Axon
Execution cycles 35,860 64,421 33,008
% Of execution time 27% 48% 25%
(1) Task I/O data (bytes) 128/24 128/36 128/16
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iteration of compartmental calculations within 50 ls.
(2) The IO-network model
Fig. 22 illustrates (a) the network-model architecture and (b) its
MPSoC implementation. Every cell receives, through the dendritic
compartment, the inﬂuence of its eight neighboring cells (thus
modeling the biological gap-junctions). The dendrites in every cell
also receive an externally evoked current Iapp. Conversely, the
axon voltage Va of all cells is the system output. The system works
in lock-step computing discrete output values that, when aggre-
gated in time, contribute to form the electrical waveform response
of the system. The IO-network controller module ensures the cor-
rect synchronization of the cell computations when multiple cells
and compartments are being executed simultaneously.
(3) Application’s mapping and implementation onto the MPSoC
The inferior-olive-model source code, initially available in Mat-
lab, has been rewritten in C and then parallelized and ported to the
DeSyRe baseline platform presented in Section 6. Fig. 22 shows the
mapping of the application components onto the hardware cores.
The controller block runs on the SiMS processor and is in charge
of initializing the necessary data structures (especially the cell
states) and, then, it runs the loop that guarantees the synchroniza-
tion among the concurrent tasks. We deﬁne as task the execution
of one instance of one of the cell compartments and, therefore,
have three types of tasks: dendrite, soma and axon. Based on initial
proﬁling results (see Table 5), we have identiﬁed the soma task as
the most computationally intensive one. Therefore, the dendrite
and axon tasks are mapped to Xentium processors, while the soma
has been implemented in hardware as a custom IP block, as de-
scribed in the previous section.
A shared-memory tile holds a large data structure that contains
the state of all the cells in the network. The state of each cell is a
collection of variables that represent, at every moment in time,
the compartment’s electrical potentials and the concentrations of
the chemical elements modeled. In every time step, the controller
issues three tasks per cell times the total number of modeled cells.Within DeSyRe, pre-recorded real neural-signal traces will be used
as inputs for the evaluation of the proposed system.
The current prototype also includes an AHB subsystem with a
Leon2 processor and a few peripherals for interfacing with a host
PC. In the second stage of the project, the AHB subsystem can be
used for implementing the fault-free part of the DeSyRe system.
Furthermore, the dashed components in Fig. 22(a) indicate how
the system is scaled by adding pairs of Xentiums and memory tiles
if required. The abundant parallelism in the application, combined
with the use of a NoC, allow the application performance to scale
along. While the Custom-IP is designed to cope with the added per-
formance pressure of tens of Xentium cores, the SiMS core is ex-
pected to saturate ﬁrst. One solution we envision is the use of a
clustered architecture with several SiMS cores. This architectural
style is particularly interesting also from the biological point of
view, since it matches the clustering of neurons that naturally hap-
pens in the brain.
7.2. Artiﬁcial pancreas
In some forms of diabetes, the pancreas cannot produce insulin
sufﬁciently. The sheer number and increasing rates of such pa-
tients worldwide is a major incentive for developing a so-called
‘‘artiﬁcial pancreas’’ device. In essence, such a device is a closed-
loop-control implant which samples the glucose levels in the blood
stream and releases insulin as needed (see Fig. 23). Even though an
actual, chronic artiﬁcial pancreas has not been developed yet, glu-
cose-sensing implants have constantly increased in numbers and
improved over the years [4,5].
Given the constantly increasing number of diabetic patients,
Neurasmus envisions implementing the artiﬁcial pancreas implant
as a DeSyRe-based, implantable system for automatically and accu-
rately regulating blood glucose levels. In a fashion similar to the
artiﬁcial-cerebellum application, this system is also subject to tight
requirements of:
 high reliability due to its medical application;
 security (to avoid intruders);
 power efﬁciency for portability; and
 adaptability to different input patterns.
(1) Application’s description
As shown in Fig. 23(a), the current system contains a module for
processing sensory data and calculating the insulin dose, and a
module for data logging that includes compression, encryption
and checksuming. In developing this application, we adopt the
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Fig. 23. Block diagram of (a) the artiﬁcial-pancreas application, and (b) its mapping onto the MPSoC architecture.
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while improving on the state of the art by providing highly
defect-tolerant devices, suitable for chronic implantation. The
encrypted data logging feature is a further innovation in our
system.
(1) Application’s mapping
Fig. 23(b) illustrates the mapping of the artiﬁcial-pancreas
application onto the MPSoC platform. The user interface and the
system control runs on the SiMS processor. The control algorithm
that decides on the insulin dose based on the glucose readings is
implemented in custom hardware. Finally, the data-logging block
is serviced by a Xentium processor.
8. Conclusions
The increasing need for fault tolerance imposed by the currently
observed technology scaling introduces signiﬁcant performance
and power overheads. In our attempt to alleviate these overheads,
the DeSyRe project will deliver a new generation of – by design –
reliable systems, at a reduced power and performance cost. This
is achieved through the following main contributions. Rather than
aiming at totally fault-free chips, DeSyRe designs fault-tolerant
systems built using unreliable components. In addition, DeSyRe
systems are on-demand adaptive to various types and densities
of faults, as well as to other system constraints and application
requirements. A new dynamically reconﬁgurable substrate is de-
signed and combined with runtime system software support in or-
der to leverage on-demand adaptation, customization, and
reliability at reduced cost. The above will result in a well-deﬁned,
generic and repeatable design framework for a large variety of
SoCs. The proposed framework is applied to two medical SoCs with
high reliability constraints and diverse performance and power
requirements.
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